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WILL NBA PLAYERS GO TO EUROPE?
VyShaey Mitchell*
I. INTRODUCrION
Rumors have recently plagued the National Basketball Association
(NBA) that some of its finest players would consider taking their tal-
ent overseas to the play in EuroLeagues. Players such as LeBron
James have been quoted saying that he would take his talent over seas
if he could make $50,000,000 a year.' Kobe Bryant has also admitted
he would consider leaving the NBA to play in Europe for the right
amount of money.2 With the league's loss of Josh Childress 3, promises
made by the Euroleagues, which cannot be matched by the NBA,
along with the rise of the Euro, even the most casual fan cannot help
but to worry about the future of the NBA's biggest stars staying in the
United States (U.S.). So why aren't owners worried?
For years professional athletes have been given generous signing
bonuses and signed high-end contracts with both teams and compa-
nies, who wish to have the athletes, endorse their products. It is diffi-
cult to even fathom the lifestyles that athletes are accustomed. It
would be natural to think that players' decisions to leave the NBA are
motivated solely by the dollar or in this case the Euro. On the outside
it appears that athletes have all they need and more, and that leaving
to play in Europe for more money would be nothing more than vorac-
ity. In 2008 it was reported that LeBron James' salary and winnings
brought him over $12 million. Not to be outdone, Kobe Bryant made
over $19 million from his salary and winnings alone, and Kevin Gar-
nett's salary and winnings yielded him $22 million in the same year.4
Professional athletes can be considered a sole proprietor or a single
business entity. They practice regularly to hone their craft, take on
activities that can lead to career ending, if not life altering, injuries,
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, DePaul College of Law.
1. Mike Cranston, Europe Suddenly An Option for Top NBA Players, San Francisco Chroni-
cle, Aug. 9, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/08/09/SPT2127GD7.DTL.
2. Id.
3. Frank Deford, America's new trade Deficit, NPR, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyld=96861875.
4. Jonah Freedman, Ranking the 50 Highest-earning Athletes in the U.S., Sports Illustrated.
2008 http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/specials/fortunate50/2008/index.htmi.
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hire a team of professionals to maintain their image and maintain
marketability. Many live their lives everyday on and off the field to
conform to their service contracts. They are like any other employees
who feel that they offer a unique talent and want to be accurately
compensated in their contracts. The NBA no longer has a monopoly
on professional basketball as a sport or a business; European leagues
have established themselves in the market and players are looking at
all of their options to make sound decisions regarding their profes-
sional careers.5
This article will look at whether there are sound business issues that
could be the force behind top NBA players leaving to play in Europe
or if it is just a trend, and like all trends will soon fade away. First, in
order to better understand the intricacies of salary decision-making,
this article will first examine the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) of sports teams, specifically the NBA. The CBA is a general
negotiated agreement that governs the relationship between employ-
ers and their employees. 6 The agreement among athletes and team
owners has evolved over the years while continuing to maintain their
goal of a viable economic regulatory system and competitive balance.
Secondly, this article will look at the fundamental bases and differ-
ent goals that drive the negotiations of the United States and Europe's
CBA. The fundamental basis that underlies European labor negotia-
tions is vastly different from that of the United States. As it stands,
the Euroleagues enjoy a more relaxed agreement or the absence of
one unified agreement; leaving the laws that govern sports contracts
to be decided by the individual states.7
Third, this article will examine the reasons that may underline a
player's decision to play in a Euroleague. In the past, playing over-
seas marked the end of that basketball player's career.8 Today,
younger, fresher players in their prime are opting to compete on the
international level. Not only are they taking into consideration the
larger contract options, they are also looking to the dismantling of the
United States economy and its position as a world leader. However,
owners and management do not see the movement as a threat but an
5. Geoffrey C. Arnold, Europe calls, NBA Answers, Oregonlive.com, July 31, 2008, http://
www.oregonlive.com/nba/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/sports/1217474723246870.xml&coll=7
(archive).
6. FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw §18:2 (2004).
7. Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of Professional Athletes: Differences Between the United
States and the European Union Concerning Free Agency, 11 SPLAWJ 223, 252 (2004).
8. Adrian Wojnarowski, Europe offers more than a vacation for players, July 23 2008, http://
sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-nbaeurope072308&prov=yhoo&type=lgns.
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inevitable change that is welcomed.9 This article ultimately attempts
to predict how professional basketball players' moving to the
Euroleagues will generally affect the NBA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. United States Collective Bargaining Agreement
The United States collective bargaining agreement (CBA) estab-
lishes rules and regulations for labor agreements between employers
and employees.' 0 In the sports arena the agreements vary from sport
to sport, but they by and large relate to issues regarding strikes, lock-
outs, club discipline, standard pay, college draft, etc.1 The issues ne-
gotiated over generally draw from the goal of economic regularity,
which fosters a competitive balance among teams and players. In an
effort to obtain its goal several issues that make up the agreement
continue to be the subject to ridicule and constant change. Issues that
give rise to constant debate include the division of league revenue, as
well as age and education requirements. 12 Division of league revenue,
at one point, did not pose a problem. This is because the owners had
"unilateral power over terms and conditions of players' employ-
ment."' 3 The age and education requirement imposed on potential
players has wavered over the years; at one point refusing to allow
players under 19 years of age such as Haywood, then permitting play-
ers such as Kevin Garnett and Kobe Bryant to enter immediately after
high school, and finally coming full circle, demanding recent high
school graduates spend one year at the college level.
1. History of United States Collective Bargaining Agreement
The unilateral power of team owners was originally held through
the use of the MLB's and NFL's Rerserve clause, the NFL's Rozelle
clause, as well as the draft.14 However, the introduction of player un-
ions reduced the attractiveness of the clauses, which were subse-
quently weakened through both MLB and NFL arbitration and
litigation.15 After the demise of the Reserve and Rozelle clauses, the
sports world was forced to modify its economic regulatory systems.
9. That change is the move of American players to play in Europe.
10. FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw §18:2.
11. Id.
12. Richard A. Kaplan, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A Misguided Regulatory Regime, 104
COLUm. L. REV. 1615 (2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Later attempts to acquire peace of economic regularity were sought
through the use of restriction of movement through limitations on free
agents and drafting as well as the use of salary caps.16 Soon it was
realized that the two modes of operation did not address all of the
goals of the CBA, and were therefore unsuccessful. Efforts to simul-
taneously obtain economic regularity, maintain a competitive balance
among teams, and satisfy both players and team owners, were all satis-
fied with the introduction of the luxury tax.' 7 The idea of a luxury tax
materialized in 1994 and was realized in 1997 in MLB's CBA. Al-
though the NBA has a different framework than MLB, there is one
common denominator: "the entity taxed is required to pay a specified
percentage of the margin by which its spending exceeds the mandated
threshold."' 8
a. Free Agency
In a free agent's utopia, players could create competition among
teams for their services. 19 By restricting movement between teams or
instituting free agency requirements, players were disallowed a free
market in which players could create competition, which increased
market costs. 2 0 Only players who had completed performance under
their contracts were allowed to move and bargain with new teams. 21
Player drafts were also designed to restrict free agency and specifically
focused on those entering the league.22
b. Salary Caps
Although seemingly impermissible as an anticompetitive restriction
on trade, salary caps are a legal valid way of limiting trade among
players of professional sport teams. 23 The cap models used in the
NBA involves a convoluted revenue sharing plan, which places a ceil-
ing on players' salaries for the upcoming season; caps are instituted to
restrict both team spending and player earnings.
16. Id. at 1618.
17. Id. ( Mechanisms employed to internally regulate professional sports leagues includes
three categories of both direct and indirect salary regulation: free agency, salary capping, and
taxing; taxing was intended to address problems the free agency and salary capping could not).
18. Id. at 1627
19. Id. at 1619 (an unrestricted free agent is a player who completes his duty under his con-
tract and who is no longer subject to any exclusive negotiating rights).
20. Id. at 1615
21. Id. at 1619
22. Id. at 1622
23. Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Assn, 809 F.2d 954, 962, (2d Cir. 1987).
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The CBA sets a ceiling on how much a team can spend on players
and how much an individual player can make. The desire to limit
player salaries, led the league to decide to tax players' share of basket-
ball related income. 24 Team caps determine the total amount of
money a team could pay to all of its players and forces teams to think
critically on which players they can afford, at what other player's ex-
pense and determine how close their offer can be to player's actual
worth. Initially, team caps were set at a predetermined fixed sum or
53% of the sum of the following formula: "the leagues' gross revenue
minus player benefits, divided by the number of teams in the
league." 25 Most often the team cap was determined by a percentage
of basketball related income (BRI), including revenue produced by
the league from sources such as ticket sales, corporate sponsorships
and broadcast revenue. 26 In 1998 players' share of BRI increased four
percentage points to 57%.27
The CBA also set out to limit the players' salaries. Hard caps were
widely rejected by players, as it left them feeling as if their talent was
not being valued. 28 Soft caps were not favored by the league as there
were many loopholes left for crafty teams and agents to crawl
through. Limiting players' salaries is justified on grounds of leveling
the economic market and maintaining a relative pay scale. Individual
player caps are limits on the amount an individual player can earn.
The amount that a team could pay to a player just drafted was also
limited in amount. By limiting rookie salaries, the rate of escalating
salaries was slowed and allowed those new players time to prove that
they were deserving of higher pay, while preventing an upward driven
market. 29 Salaries of veterans to the sport are also limited to prevent
the amount a team could spend on any one player. The cap on veter-
ans will encourage the market to "readjust downward," and a players
worth will be judged by comparing their skill with those whose salaries
have been limited by the cap.30
24. Id. at 1633. Basketball related income is the aggregate operating revenue, including the
value of barter transactions, received or to be received on an accrual basis by the NBA, NBA
Properties, Inc., including any subsidiaries.
25. Id. at 1623.
26. Id. at 1624.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1633
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1624.
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2. Luxury Tax
As a new innovative regulatory system, the luxury tax imposes a
penalty on teams that spend above a collectively bargained level.31
The appeal of the tax was that it appeared to be a compromise for all
involved.32 The goal of the luxury tax was two-fold: (1) find and eco-
nomic regulatory system that satisfied both the team owners and the
player; and (2) allow for a competitive balance among teams and play-
ers. Team owners were satisfied, as the tax appeared as prevention of
continued spending, acting as a quasi-salary cap; imposing a penalty
on teams exceeded fixed spending limit.33 League players were con-
tent with the tax under the general thought that it relieved them of the
restrictions of a salary cap and allowed for unlimited salary growth.34
a. How "Luxury Tax" Works
Unable to secure a hard cap, the league instituted an escrow system
to which teams would deposit 10% of all players' salaries for the sea-
son.3 5 In the most recent CBA agreement, the percentage of player
salaries withheld declined from 10% to 8%.36 The money in escrow is
distributed among team owners to "a point where the player salaries
are reduced to that percentage, if there was in fact a spending over-
age."37 The escrow system acts as a form of insurance against player
salaries rising above a specified percentage of league revenue and
penalty against free spending teams.3 8 The luxury tax penalty comes
into play in the event that the amount in escrow does not cover the
overage. When the tax is enforced, any team whose players' salaries
exceed 1/29 of 61% of BRI minus his benefits will be assessed a 100%
tax rate on any money spent going beyond the penalty threshold.39
b. How the Luxury Tax Plans to Meet the Challenges of League
Teams
Team caps proved to be unsuccessful as they were considered "soft
caps," plagued with exceptions and loopholes. Hard caps were not
any more successful as players did not accept them. Unable to secure
a salary cap, it was decided that taxation on the players' salaries would
31. Id. at 1617.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1626.
36. FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw §18:2
37. Kaplan, supra note 12 at 1633.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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be the best substitute.4 0 This taxation forces teams who spend over
the bargained level, to pay back the league and teams some percent-
age of what they pay players. The desired outcome is that, by forcing
teams to pay back a portion of their profits, they will be encouraged to
rework their salary formulas.4 1 However, the bargained for level does
not have to be an absolute ceiling for those teams who are able and
willing to afford it.42 By assessing such a penalty, the luxury tax ap-
pears to be a viable solution to a regulated economic system.
3. The Effect of the Luxury Tax
Season penalty levels are determined at the end of the prior season,
making them merely predictions; predictions that have several nega-
tive affects. One affect is the "threat effect." 4 3 Teams' predictions are
incapable of being accurate and as a result are made very conserva-
tively 44 The conservative predictions prevent teams from spending
and players from receiving an excess in pay in amounts ranging from
$1- 3 million. The tax is also stated as the cause for a "marginal ef-
fect," which results in teams signing players that will increase team
revenue or value, while ensuring cost of player will not exceed players
output 4 5 This means that teams will benefit handsomely in compari-
son to the value of a players actual worth - teams will only sign a
player "whose benefit exceeds or meets marginal cost." 4 6 Other criti-
cisms of the luxury tax include the fact that teams will become thriftier
- attempting to operate teams successfully on as small of a budget as
possible and not paying players at a level that accurately reflects their
worth 47 It has also been said that use of the tax may lead to a greater
"disparity in team spending and frustrate the objectives of other im-
portant aspects of the NBA's current CBA" 48 Another argument is
that the robust tax model works against the leagues stated goals.49
4. Age/ Education Requirements
Today the age and education requirements for prospective NBA
players mandate that the player be at least 19 years of age and one
40. Id. at 1628
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1637
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1615
49. Id.
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year removed from high school.50 Prior to 1971, CBA negotiations
stated that players had to wait until four years after high school to
become eligible for the NBA draft.5 ' This restriction on eligibility
changed with the case of Haywood,52 in which a prospective player
claimed that the age and education requirement was a violation of
Section One of the Sherman Act.5 3 Justice Warner's decision was
three-fold, allowing for an injunction and overturning the leagues
draft requirements. On appeal, the District Court stayed the injunc-
tion, however, the Supreme Court agreed with the ruling and reason-
ing of the Trial Court.
Age and Education requirements have wavered over the years and
subjected to much criticism. Opponents of the requirement state that
everyone benefits from the age and education requirements, except
the prospective rookies and fans.54 While the potential rookies are
subjected to free labor by teams of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA),55 veterans avoid competition against raw talent.
Individual club owners also benefit, because they are given more time
to scout new recruits.56 The requirements do not take into account
the financial freedom that entrance into the draft may otherwise pro-
vide young destitute players and their families.57 There are concerns
that if one ineligible player becomes successful overseas, it may "turn
the rule on its head."5 One player's success could also cause the re-
quirement to lose the support of NBPA, making it a big issue with the
union and prove to violate anti-trust laws.59
B. European Collective Bargaining Agreement
It is debatable whether the European Union (EU) has the compe-
tence to regulate sports through the treaty of the European Commu-
nity (EC). Because the EU can only govern topics specifically
50. Fundamentals of Sports Law §18:2, see also Marc Edelman, Above the Law: Legal Tab-
loid, Sports and the Law: NBA Age / Education Requirement Pushes Jennings Overseas, July
2008, http://abovethelaw.com/2008/07/sports-andthelaw-nba-ageeduc.php.
51. Marc Edelman, supra note 50.
52. Haywood v. NatnT Basketball Ass'n haywood case Victim is injured by being excluded
from market he seeks to enter. Competition is being injured. NBA had in essence established
their own gov't
53. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
54. Marc Edelman, supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (Jennings' family was financially crippled forcing him to sign with European team in-
stead of playing for NCAA).
58. Id.
59. Id..
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mentioned in the EC, the treaty created a European Model of
Sports.60 Although the European Model of Sports addressed issues
specific to the world of European sports, it was not a mandatory
source of law and consequently had no real legal impact.61 Yet, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that it must be applied to
sports as long as "sports [is] part of an economic activity defined in
article two of the EC Treaty." 62 As a result of the model itself falling
in line with the EC Treaty, it is also subject to the four fundamental
freedoms of the Treaty, including free movement of persons, goods
and capital, and the freedom to provide services.
The EU's initial intention behind professional sports was to simply
win competitions.63 The influence of state law was very limited, be-
cause very little economic interest was involved. As a result of little
economic interest, there was a lack of state regulations and private
norms of governing bodies developed, referred to as "lax sportiva." 64
With increasing popularity and economic interest, EU courts held that
norms had to be in accordance with national and international law.6 5
The desire for parallelism of the private governing bodies and national
and international laws created two columns of legal sports analysis: (1)
The national law of a state, including public international law and (2)
the lex sportiva. 66 Without common ground it is not surprising that
there is not a CBA to govern the employment issues among
Euroleague players and team owners. 67 Matters normally handled by
a CBA are governed by the individual states, with the exception of a
few countries. 68 Not having a CBA does not rid European leagues
from the issues experienced by U.S. professional teams such as free
agency, which is dealt with under the protection of the free movement
of workers by the EC Treaty.
C. Recent Attractions to the Euroleague
European leagues have played their role as secondary leagues to
the NBA, accepting that their strength in sports rested in professional
European football (American soccer). Recently, Euroleagues have
managed to attract the attention of NBA players of all calibers. Oper-
60. Joklik, supra note 7 at 288.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Joklik, supra note 7, at 229.
66. Id. at 230.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 231.
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ations that have increased in prestige and resources may be the start
to "an irreversible change," thrusting Europe into a true competitor's
position as a "rival in free agency."69 Enticed by increased salaries,
added perks and improved competition, NBA players are no longer
looking at Euroleagues as an alternative but a viable option.70
LeBron James was quoted admitting to considering going overseas if
he could make $50 million.71 With larger and in some cases non-exis-
tent budgets, European clubs can exceed the NBA mid-level in their
bids. 72
1. Economy
Changes in the United States economy have greatly affected NBA
teams and players. The strength of the Euro has increased in relation
to the dollar.73 In 2008 the Euro reached an all time high of $1.54 per
Euro. 74 Toward the close of 2008, the dollar grew stronger, but not
strong enough to reclaim its place as the dominant currency. At the
close of 2008, the Euro decreased in value to approximately $1.281 per
Euro.75 The change in the U.S. government has simultaneously ad-
versely affected the dollar and strengthened the Euro. Economy fore-
casts do not view the rise of the Euro as a fleeting trend, as some
predict the Euro will continue to outshine the dollar well into 2009,
climbing back up to $1.403 by June. Other economists argue that the
dollar will not stay down for long. However, a cross-section of strong
currencies from powerful countries will emerge, disallowing the U.S.
to maintain such a large advantage as before. 76
2. Player reasoning
Historically, NBA players looked to sign with European leagues
when their bodies broke down before their hearts were ready to re-
tire. For instance, players such as Dominique Wilkins and Bob McA-
69. Adrian Wojnarowski, supra note 8.
70. Arnold, supra note 5. (NBA cannot match perks of paying fees and expenses that nor-
mally come out of players' salaries. If a player in EU is makes $2million net, they take home
$2million.)
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mike Cranston, supra note 1.
74. Id.
75. The Financial Forecast Center, http://www.forecasts.org/exchange-rate/euro-exchange-
rate.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2008).
76. Posting of James Pethokoukis to U.S. News, Capital Commerce America and the Future of
the Dollar, March 5, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capital-commerce/2008/3/5/america-
and-the-future-of-the-dollar.htmI (March 5, 2008, 15:30 EST).
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doo played overseas later in their careers.7 7 In Europe, a player's
strength, size and smarts are just as valuable if not more so than his
speed and explosiveness.7 8 Players are also beginning to recognize the
"crimp" the NBA CBA has put on what teams.7 9 As a result of the
lack of spending ability, recent perceptions are that the quality of
ownership has also declined as teams try to survive off the smallest
amount of money as possible. 0 Veteran players look to European
contracts for accurate compensation for their services. Threat of play-
ers taking their talent overseas also serves as leverage for more lucra-
tive contracts in United States.8 ' For prospective players, playing
abroad simply offers pay for their services. 8 2
III. ANALYSIS
While the league's goal of economic regularity is commendable, its
means of ascertaining the goal seems to be counter-productive. Forc-
ing team owners to predict overage of agreed upon team spending
puts them at a horrible disadvantage, in that they are forced to spend
conservatively and think twice about adding players that can increase
the value of their club. 8 3 They are put in a position where they cannot
accurately pay players their true worth. As a result players may per-
ceive that their unique skills and talents are being taken for granted.
In addition players are noticing a decline in the quality of team owner-
ship, as in the Atlanta and Memphis clubs.8 4 If the decline becomes a
trend, players may be forced to jump from a sinking ship.
Enforcing escrow fund allows teams who can and are willing to af-
ford it to continue to overspend. If the CBA is seen as a contract
between the club teams, the voluntary overage by able teams can be
seen as an efficient breach. In an issue of fairness, this would most
certainly be considered unfair to other teams and players. In addition,
teams who are boarder-line to exceeding the agreed upon salary cap
are at the greatest disadvantage when considering to add a new player
to their roster, preventing them from making a competitive offer. The
amount offered to the additional player may not reflect the player's
77. Posting of Jonathan Feigan to Chron.com, A Trend? Not Yet. But NBA Reminded It's a
Small World After All, Jul. 24, 20008, http://blogs.chron.com/nba/2008/07/atrend not-yet-but-
nba-remind.htmi (Jul. 24, 2008, 16:48).
78. Adrian Wojnarowski, supra note 8.
79. Cranston, supra note 1.
80. Id.
81. Posting of Jonathan Feigan to Chron.ecom, supra note 77.
82. Edelman, supra note 50.
83. Kaplan, supra note 12 at 1637.
84. Cranston, supra note 1.
2010] 231
232 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 6:221
actual worth, because the team must consider the amount of luxury
tax it will pay on the amount exceeding the salary cap.8 5
The recent decrease in the escrow ceiling from 10% to 8% lowers
the amount of taxed player salaries to cover overages. If salaries are
not increasing, this could very well lead to less money to cover the
overages which would almost invariably lead to consistent taxing of
100% of individual player salaries. The likelihood of overages is
nearly moot as an issue here; in 2004 all teams in the NBA went over
the agreed upon spending level.86
With regard to the age/education requirement, I believe that if a
stronger policy for the requirement was enforced it would continue to
gain support. However, as it stands, there is no benefit from the rule.
Everyone from the profit seekers of the NCAA to the veteran players
of the league appears to benefit while the prospects are forced to at-
tend college for at least one year. Many who attend college value it as
a logical means to achieving their career goals and becoming produc-
tive members of society. Yet, colleges are providing full scholarships
to young men who would rather not be there, instead giving them to
those who go into debt because they do want to be there.
Prospects that would otherwise be eligible to enter the draft may
have a viable alternative in the Euroleagues. Brandon Jennings made
that decision and, if he proves to be successful, more age ineligible
players may view playing abroad as a more realistic alternative. With
or without a strong policy reason I do not believe the players will
deem it justifiable. Unless the NBA is willing to completely do away
with this requirement, recent high school graduates will continue to
take their talent abroad. It may be more economically sound to allow
these players entry, especially if doing so would change the game in
ways prodigies such as Kobe Bryant, Kevin Garnett and LeBron
James did straight out of high school. It is ironic that three of the
league's highest paid players would not have entered the league when
they did had they been subjected to the age and education require-
ment that is currently enforced.
Today, Euroleague team owners have bigger budgets and are
backed by a stronger economy. By promising bigger salaries with lit-
tle to no taxes and additional perks, Europe will entice some of NBA's
free agents to travel across the ocean. After all, a bigger salary could
infer that their services are valued more in foreign lands. Although
European team's bargaining power is creating a revolving door for
85. Kaplan, supra note 12 at 1638
86. FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw §18:2
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international play, they appear to have a ways to go before their eco-
nomic and legal system makes them a leader in the sport. With no
true universal CBA or enforceable sports law model, many issues
could be left to decisions of first impression or completely unresolved.
Stability of the NBA rules, regulations and bargaining tactics may or
may not be something veteran players in their prime are willing to risk
for more money. However, it is feasible for some players that have
capped salaries under the CBA to believe it is worth it. If LeBron
James is indeed offered $50 million to play in Europe, that would be
more than the $20 million he currently earns in the U.S.87
IV. CONCLUSION
Just as it took the Euro some time to gain strength against the dol-
lar, I anticipate that Euroleagues vying for young American talent will
also gain strength. With the recognition for a united bargaining agree-
ment and the evolving laws of the EU, as well as the momentum
gained in 2008 of third and fourth string players going abroad, it will
only be a matter of time when quality players will play aboard. No
longer will the NBA be able to rely on players wanting to stay in the
states for the "competitiveness of the game" as the competition may
be equally as strong abroad.
87. Jonah Freedman, supra note 4.
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